Abstract: This paper investigates whether product market power affects trade credit decisions. We exploit the 2007-08 credit crisis in the U.S. as an exogenous source of variation in external financing
Introduction
Trade credit theory predicts that the demand for trade credit increases during periods of monetary tightening [Biais & Gollier (1997) ]. Empirical evidence shows that trade credit can indeed redistribute liquidity from firms with access to financial markets to constrained firms during such periods [Meltzer (1960) , Schwartz (1974) , Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (2000) , Nilsen (2002) , Fisman and Love (2003) ], offsetting, at least in part, the bank lending channel effect of scarce liquidity. However, recent empirical studies [Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) , Love and Zaidi (2010) , and Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013)] show that when there is a drastic reduction in the external supply of funds, such as during a financial crisis, interfirm trade credit may redistribute liquidity in the economy only for a limited time.
As the crisis widens and deepens, even liquidity-rich firms may lose their ability to access bank and capital markets and cut trade credit.
Another strand of the literature states that the dependency relation between seller and buyer, such as product market power and the bargaining power between the two parties, determines the extension and uptake of trade credit by firms. There are opposing theoretical predictions regarding market and bargaining power. Originally, Meltzer (1960) state that larger market power implies more trade credit extension, and Petersen and Rajan (1997) have empirically confirmed his predictions. Biais and Gollier (1997) , Wilner (2000) and Cuñat (2007) have also developed theoretical models predicting that suppliers with more market power extend more trade credit. However, a set of recent papers [Wilson and Summers (2002) , Fabbri and Klapper (2008) , Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) ] predicts exactly the opposite. According to these studies, small firms with low bargaining power sell to large customers with low margins, supply more trade credit, and even tolerate payment delays. Low market power firms also offer relatively more early payment discounts to get their products' quality inspected and at the same time receive more liquidity from their larger market power customers [Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) , Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) ]. Additionally, the model by Barbosa, Moreira and Novaes (2016) implies that interest rates embedded in trade credit discounts increase for suppliers that operate with lower margins (low market power). Another interpretation of their predictions is that supplier profitability is positively related to the amount of trade credit provided to clients. This paper studies how product market power affects trade credit decisions. We exploit the U.S. 2007/08 credit crisis as an exogenous source of variation to the supply of external finance (bank loans and capital markets funding), which directly affects firms' ability to exert market power towards suppliers and customers. As argued by Garcia-Appendini and MontoriolGarriga (2013) , this crisis provides a unique laboratory because it originated in the housing and financial sector, and the reduction in credit supply to firms was both unexpected and had its origins unrelated to nonfinancial firms. While their paper uses the credit crisis to identify the effect of financial constraints in trade credit extension, our paper focuses on the product market power channel of trade credit. We test whether firms with high market power increase the extension and uptake of trade credit relative to low market power firms according to Meltzer (1960) , Biais and Gollier (1997) , Wilner (2000) and Cuñat (2007) , in contrast to Wilson and Summers (2002) , Fabbri and Klapper (2008) and Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) . We also analyze to what extent firms with higher market power support their suppliers financially during the low liquidity period, as predicted by Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) , Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) and Barbosa, Moreira and Novaes (2016) . Our results show that the provision and uptake of trade credit is heterogeneous across firms, depending on their market power. Before the crisis, the receivables days period is 5 days longer for firms with high market power compared to low market power firms on average, confirming Meltzer (1960) , Biais and Gollier (1997) , Wilner (2000) , Cuñat (2007) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) . High market power firms also uptake trade credit from their suppliers for 24 days longer than those with low market power. These results confirm Long et al. (1993) and Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen's (2011) theories of product quality asymmetry, as high market power firms may require more time from their suppliers to verify the product. During the crisis, however, firms with higher market power increase net trade credit extension by at least 6 days compared to firms with low market power. This increase is statistically and economically significant and represents more than 11% of the median firm receivable days in our sample. Firms with high market power increase their net trade credit days during the crisis (relative to low market power firms) mainly by paying their suppliers approximately 6 days earlier and slightly increasing trade credit extension to their customers. These findings are compliant with the larger early payment discounts offered to high market power firms by firms with low bargaining power [Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011), Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) ]. Our results hold to a number of robustness tests. Importantly, our inferences hold after controlling for cash holdings, short-term debt, cash flow, firm size and fixed capital. We go further and analyze other variables after the crisis to understand the mechanism driving the increase in net trade credit days for high market power firms. We find that these firms obtain an increase of up to 1.7% in sales relative to low market power firms. This increase in sales comes at the expense of a reduction in gross margins of up to 1.8% relative to firms with low market power in the second year after the start of the crisis. On the other hand, high market power firms in our sample cut their payable days sharply by 6 days. A plausible reason for such decision is that high market power firms need to keep suppliers away from financial distress during the crisis to avoid losing their monopoly rents in the product market, consistent with Wilner's (2000) reasoning. This finding is also consistent with the higher offer of two-part payables to higher market power customers (early payment discount clause), as in Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011), Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) and Barbosa, Moreira, and Novaes (2016) . By paying their suppliers earlier, they also avoid the large interest rates embedded in their payables, which are expected to increase during the crisis, as in Barbosa, Moreira, and Novaes (2016).
We do not find evidence for larger trade credit extension by low market power firms as in Wilson and Summers (2002) , Fabbri and Klapper (2008) and Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) . It is possible that their findings are driven by their sample choice, which includes only small and medium firms, as opposed to our study that uses publicly traded firms.
This paper contributes to the previous literature by considering the impact of competition in the product markets and bargaining power as important decision factors for the company to extend trade credit. In particular, we add evidence that trade credit can be used for strategic purposes in the product market, which is consistent with some of the market power theory papers. We also add evidence on the mechanism driving trade credit decisions and their impacts on costs and increase in sales. The exogenous nature of the financial crisis provides a clean identification strategy that allows us to infer a causal relationship from product market power to trade credit.
More importantly, this paper adds to a growing literature on trade credit during financial crises. Most of the existing literature addresses the role of financial constraints and the redistribution theory during a crisis [Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) , Love and Zaidi (2010) , Kestens et al. (2012) , Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) and Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016) ], whereas this paper adds another important dimension to trade credit decisions during a crisis. Our results imply that firms with similar access to liquidity but a different degree of market power respond very differently to a credit supply shock. We contribute to the literature concerning trade credit showing that the effects reported by the previous literature are better explained by including market power as an important causal factor.
Results reported in other papers (e.g., Love et al., 2007) regarding the decrease in the redistribution role of trade credit during crises may be mainly driven by firms operating in highly competitive markets. To the best of our knowledge, no paper explores credit crises to study market power as an important trade credit driver.
Our empirical identification strategy employs diff-in-diff models with firm and industrytime fixed effects to account for firm unobserved heterogeneity and possible industry-specific shocks in different years. Our identification strategy is designed to use the 2007/8 financial crisis as an exogenous source of variation in the firms' ability to exert their product market power towards their clients and suppliers. Because the crisis reduces the supply of funding from banks and capital markets, it increases firms' demand for trade credit and changes their ability to exert market power. To infer causality, we use pre-crisis market power as a measure of sensitivity to the effects of the financial crisis. While it is clear that the assignment between treated (high market power) and untreated (low market power) firms is not random, we argue that the assignment is unrelated to the treatment (the credit crisis) because of the exogenous nature of the external credit supply shock. Therefore, the assignment is as good as random in the sense that ex ante firm market power is unrelated to the origin of the shock.
To disentangle the market power impact from other financial factors, we control for ex ante liquidity, short-term debt, fixed assets, firm size and financial constraints. Our methodology is similar to Duchin et al. (2010) and Love et al. (2007) . We also rule out the possibility that financial constraints could drive our findings by estimating separate regressions for constrained and unconstrained firms, following Duchin et al. (2010) , using: (i) the WhitedWu index, (ii) the Hadlock-Pierce SA index, and (iii) the firms' size expressed by the natural logarithm of sales.
Our sample uses Compustat data on U.S. from 2004 to 2010. We measure market power in the product market using the Lerner index, which is obtained by the price-cost margin (PCM),
following Petersen and Rajan (1997) . PCM is widely used as a competition measure by empirical studies, as buyer concentration tends to be negatively correlated with PCM [Collins and Preston (1969) , Schmalensee (1989) and Sutton (2007) ].
A common concern in diff-in-diff is whether the dependent variables follow parallel trends for treated and control groups before the credit shock. Panel A of figure 2 shows that median receivables days of high market power and low market power firms follow increasing and almost parallel trends prior to the crisis, and they start to decrease for both sets of firms after the onset of the credit crisis. Panel B of Figure 2 also shows nearly parallel trends in the pre-crisis period, but high market power firms decrease median payable days more than low market power firms do after the start of the crisis. A possible entrapment in interpreting this different effect on payable days as caused by differences in market power is the possibility that high and low market power belong to different industries and that unobserved industry-specific shocks drive this effect. To address this issue, we run regressions with industry-time fixed effects as well as placebo regressions, setting the crisis to 9/11/2001, when the terrorist attacks to the Twin Towers caused a recession that was not preceded by a credit crunch. Results from these robustness checks confirm our findings and add to the validity of our identification strategy. Credit Days These graphics show the median lines for the receivables to assets ratio and the payables to assets ratio before and after the crisis onset. HiMP and LoMP stand for high and low market power, which are dummies to separate firms respectively above and below the market power median average pre-crisis.
We also document in detail the reaction mechanism of firms with more market power in trade credit supply and demand. Firms that operate in a less competitive market for their products (higher market power) reduce their payable days during the crisis more than low market power firms do, thus providing more liquidity to their suppliers. This effect adds to the mechanism described by Boissay & Gropp (2013) and Fabbri & Klapper (2009) , whereby financially unconstrained firms will alleviate the liquidity of their constrained customers downstream in the supply chain We show that firms with more market power also alleviate the liquidity needs of firms upstream in the supply chain. and Payable Days, which may be interpreted as the average number of days to receive sales and to pay suppliers. They are obtained by the ratio of receivables and payables to daily sales and the daily cost of goods sold, respectively. The daily sales and cost of goods sold are calculated by dividing quarterly sales and cost of goods sold (COGS) by the actual number of days in each quarter. This procedure follows similar studies (e.g., Love et al., 2007) .
Data
Alternatively, we also scale account receivables and payable to total assets. All variables in our models were winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers. Because working capital accounts are jointly determined by firms' policies, which in many cases try to match maturities or cash flows, we follow Love et al. (2007) We also analyze firms' Sales to Assets ratio (turnover), Payables to Assets, Receivables to Assets and Gross Margin as dependent variables to understand the different policies adopted by the firms with respect to trade credit extension relative to their total assets.
Our controls are the commonly used liquidity indicators, such as cash and equivalents, operational cash flow and short-term debt, all of them scaled by total assets, following Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) and Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) . We also control for Property, Plant and Equipment to Assets, as firms with more collateral may follow distinct trade credit policies, as in Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013).
Another possible confounder could be firms' financial constraints. To address this problem, we run separate regressions for constrained and unconstrained firms. We measure financial constraints by the Whited-Wu index, the Hadlock-Pierce size-age (S.A.) index and firms' size measured by their natural log of quarterly sales [Whited and Wu (2006) , Hadlock and Pierce (2010), Fabbri and Klapper (2009) , Love and Zaidi (2010) , Atanasova (2007) ].
Detailed formulas for these indexes are presented in appendix 2 and follow the original definitions presented by their authors.
Empirical Identification Strategy
We investigate the effects of market power on trade credit. To estimate different firms'
responses to crises, we estimate a fully saturated diff-in-diff model to analyze the differential impact of the crisis in the trade credit variables using:
( 1) where TCvarijt is the trade credit dependent variable for firm i in industry j at quarter t. HiMPi is a dummy for firms with high market power, indicating that the firm market power is above median [similar to Fabbri and Klapper (2016) ]. We use pre-crisis market power to avoid the possible effects of the shock on the variable. In robustness checks, we also use market power as a continuous variable. As already discussed, we measure market power before the crisis by the quarterly average gross margin between 2004 and 2006 for firm i. 
PostT is a dummy set to one for the T th year after the crisis (so that Post1 is a dummy for the first 4 quarters after the crisis, Post2 is a dummy for the 5 th to 8 th quarters after the crisis and so on). We follow Duchin et al. (2010) YQt capture macroeconomic fluctuations that homogeneously affect trade credit for all the firms in the sample (and subsume the PostT variables when included in the regression). In alternative specifications, we fully saturate the model with industry-quarter fixed effects that account for industry-specific shocks that homogeneously affect all the firms in a given industry j in a given quarter t (e.g., industry seasonality). Finally, εijt is the error term.
The parameters to be estimated are the vectors β', ω', and δ'. Our main coefficient of interest is the diff-in-diff coefficient ω', which represents the differential effect of market power
HiMP on the dependent variables of trade credit. Firm fixed effects subsume HiMPi and firmlevel controls in this fully saturated model.
We estimate Equation (1) with several variations. We start with a pooled OLS (i.e., without any fixed effects) without any controls and only the three PostT dummies. We follow by including HiMPi and control variables and their interaction terms. We then introduce firm and time fixed effects (and omit non-interacted pre-crisis HiMPi and controls because they are firm-invariant and are therefore subsumed by firm fixed effects). Finally, we saturate the model with industry-quarter fixed effects instead of time fixed effects. In some estimations, we collapse Post1, Post2 and Post3 into a single post-crisis dummy to ease interpretation. Standard errors are clustered at the NAICS 6-digit industry level to account for within-industry and timeseries correlation of the residuals, following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2002) .
Descriptive statistics and regression results

4.1.
Descriptive statistics
The results in table 1 show that the median firm extends 51.8 days to its customers and pays its suppliers in 41.2 days. The net trade credit days variable has a negative mean of 1.36 days. High market power firms have larger receivable and payable periods, both before and after the onset of the crisis. The mean receivables period changes only slightly for both groups of firms from the pre to the post-crisis period. The mean payables period is reduced from 44.5 to 41.7 days for low market power firms and from 69.9 to 62.9 days for high market power firms. The average firm uses 26.45% of its sales as net trade credit. A median firm will show in its balance sheet 12.6% of its assets as receivables and 5.7% as payables.
The average gross margin (our measure of market power) is 41.5% for the whole sample, and the mean gross margin changes only slightly from the pre to the post-crisis period for both groups of firms. The median firm keeps 12.2% of its assets as cash and equivalents, but firms in the 90 th percentile hold 53.3% in cash (not reported in table 1). Interestingly, pre-crisis cash does not seem to affect net trade credit significantly.
The estimations in columns 4 to 6 of table 2 introduce firm and time fixed effects. The results shown in column 4 indicate that high market power firms increase net trade credit by approximately 5 days in the year that follows the crisis and 6 days in the second and third years compared to low market power firms. One might suspect that liquidity issues, and not market power, drive these results, because treated firms could be holding more cash before the crisis.
We test this possibility in the estimations in columns 5 and 6 of table 4 by introducing pre-crisis cash positions and other firm-level controls for financial constraints (namely, short-term debt, PPE and cash flow scaled to assets). The results (point estimates and statistical significance) 6 The exact estimate in column 2 of table 2 for the increase in net trade credit for high market power firms in the first year after the crisis is 1. 990 + 4.483 = 6.473 days. For the second and third years, the effects are respectively 3. 726 + 5.097 = 8.823 days and 1.927 + 3.857 = 5.784 days. for the HiMP × postT coefficients are virtually unchanged relative to column 4. Importantly, pre-crisis firm cash does not seem to affect net trade credit significantly. 31, 2004, and June 30, 2010 . We define post1, post2 and post3 as dummies for the first, second and third years after the onset of the crisis in the third quarter of 2007, respectively. We also define post as a dummy for the three years after the crisis start. High Market Power firms have market power above the median ex ante market power measured as the average from 2004 to 2006. Cash is the average ex ante cash to assets ratio. Other covariates are defined in appendix 2 and are measured prior to the crisis. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the industry level (6-digit NAICS). Robust t-statistics are presented below each estimated parameter, and ***, ** and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
By introducing industry-time fixed effects into the estimation shown in column 7 of table 2, we obtain very similar results. The coefficients measuring the effect of market power on net trade credit reported in The fact that firms with high market power increase net trade credit days more sharply during the years following the credit crunch supports the market power theory in Meltzer (1960), Biais and Gollier (1997) , Wilner (2000) , Cuñat (2007) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) .
Indeed, the crisis may bring about an increase in price elasticity of demand, therefore justifying that firms with larger market power may use trade credit extension to increase (or at least avoid losing) their sales, as in Meltzer (1960) and Mian and Smith (1992) .
The estimations in before the crisis compared to their low market power counterparts on average, supporting Meltzer (1960) , Biais and Gollier (1997) , Wilner (2000) , Cuñat (2007) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) . However, the ωT (for HiMP×postT) coefficients are not statistically significant.
We introduce fixed effects in the estimations shown in columns 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 of table 3. The results in column 2, including firm and time fixed effects, show that firms with higher market power show a relative increase in receivables of approximately 2 days in the first year of the crisis, followed by 1.7 days in the second year and almost zero in the third. However, when we introduce cash and other financial controls in columns 3 and 4, the coefficients for the first and second years after the crisis are reduced, and the second loses statistical significance.
We still observe a small relative increase of 1.3 days in receivables in the first year on average.
Ex ante liquidity seems to play a role in the extension of trade credit to customers during the crisis: firms with higher cash and operational cash flow before the crisis increase their receivable days, even when we use both time and firm fixed effects in column 3 and add industry-time fixed effects in column 4, consistent with previous evidence. A one standard deviation increase in pre-crisis cash holdings (20.1 percentage point increase) is associated with a predicted increase of approximately 1 day in receivables in the first and second years after the crisis ceteris paribus, and a one standard deviation (5.4 percentage point) increase in cash flow / assets is associated with an increase of nearly 2 days in receivables.
7
The results from column 5 of table 3 show that high market power firms take approximately 24 days more trade credit from their suppliers (accounts payable) than low market power firms on average, which is expected according to Long et al's. (1993) and Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen's (2011) theories of product quality asymmetry by low market power firms. During the crisis, low market power firms reduce payable days by approximately 2 days in the year following the crisis and respectively 4 and 3 days in the second and third years after the crisis. More importantly, high market power firms reduce payable days by approximately 4-5 days in addition to the reduction observed for low market power firms. These inferences are practically unchanged by introducing firm, time and industry-time fixed effects and other financial controls in the estimations reported in columns 6, 7 and 8 of table 3. For instance, in model 7, we find that firms with high market power reduce their time to pay suppliers by 4.6 days in the first year after the shock and by 6.2 and 6.0 days in the following years. Finally, our results also show that firms with higher pre-crisis cash flow as well as firms with lower fixed capital increase their payable days. 8 We also find weak evidence that pre-crisis cash positions may cause an increase in payable days, although only one coefficient is statistically significant at the usual levels. 7 The computation of the effects is as follows: using the estimation in column 4, for example, a one standard deviation (20.1 percentage points) increase in pre-crisis cash / assets yields a predicted increase of 0. 201 × 4.805 = 0.966 Credit Days is the difference between these two variables, and therefore, they explain in detail the net effect in the previous table. We define post1, post2 and post3 as dummies for the first, second and third years after the onset of the crisis in the third quarter of 2007. We also define post as a dummy for the three years after the crisis start. High Market Power is set to one for firms with market power above the median ex ante market power measured as the average from 2004 to 2006. Cash is the average ex ante cash to assets ratio. Other covariates are defined in appendix 2 and are always measured as the 2004-2006 (pre-crisis) average. Models are estimated using pool or unbalanced panel data with firm/time and industry/time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level (6 digit NAICS). Robust t-statistics are presented below each estimated parameter, and ***, ** and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Taken together, the estimations shown in table 3 show that the increase in net trade credit days for higher market power firms obtained in table 2 is due to a small increase in receivables, statistically significant only in the first year, and a larger and more significant decrease in payable days for the three years after the crisis onset. Therefore, our data show that firms that operate in low-competition markets (high market power) are able to supply more liquidity to their suppliers and probably take advantage of the early payment discount. These results are Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) and Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) , who posit that high market power firms obtain more two-part contracts 9 from their suppliers. Because firms' cost of capital increases during the financial crisis, the embedded interest rates in the trade credit discount for two-part contracts become significantly larger than in normal times. Thus, high market power firms will pay their suppliers faster [Barbosa, Moreira, and Novaes (2016) ].
Disentangling Financial Constraints
A possible confounding effect for our findings is that if firms with higher market power are also less financially constrained, the results shown in tables 2 and 3 could be driven by firms' financial constraints instead of market power. To further disentangle the effects of market power and financial constraints on trade credit during the crisis, we run separate regressions for subsamples of constrained and unconstrained firms, following Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) and Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) .
Column 1 of table 4 presents our estimates of ω (the coefficients for HiMP x PostT) on net trade credit days for the baseline model without control variables (i.e., containing only the three interaction terms HiMP x PostT and firm and year-quarter fixed effects -previously reported in column 4 of table 3). We then run the same specifications for subsamples of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. We split the firms into subsamples according to the median value of each firm's financial constraint indicator. We assign firms with an abovemedian Whited-Wu index, higher Hadlock-Pierce SA index and below-median log of sales (proxy for size) 10 to each of the three constrained subsamples. Other firms are assigned to the unconstrained firm subsamples.
We verify that all the estimated coefficients ω are positive and statistically significant at the usual levels, indicating that our previous inferences about the role of market power on trade credit during a credit crisis hold for both constrained and unconstrained firms. High market power firms' predicted increase in net trade credit relative to low market power firms during the crisis ranges between approximately 2 and 8 days, depending on the year and subsample considered.
9 Contracts with early payment clauses such as 2/10 net 30. 10 We use average 2004-2006 values of each of these indicators to split firms into the subsample of firms.
Comparing the analogous coefficients obtained for constrained and unconstrained firms, we reject the hypothesis that these coefficients are equal for the Hadlock-Pierce and log of sales indicators in the first and third years of the crisis. Therefore, we cannot reject that financial constraints also exert some influence in net trade credit during the crisis. We stress, however, that market power is an important driver of trade credit for both constrained and unconstrained firms, because the coefficients ω obtained for all models are positive and significant (regardless of whether they are equal between the subsamples).
Overall, the results in table 4 confirm that market power drives firms' trade credit decisions irrespective of their degree of financial constraints and that it is neither liquidity nor financial constraints that produce our main finding. Firms with high market power are more able than their low market power counterparts to keep the redistribution channel described in Meltzer (1960) and Cuñat (2007) working even during the crisis, particularly by providing liquidity to their suppliers. 30, 2010 , for the whole sample (base model) as well as for subsamples including only firms with high (above median) or low (below median) financial constraints measured by the Whited-Wu index, the Hadlock-Pierce SA index and the size terms of ln(sales). We define post1, post2 and post3 as dummies for the first, second and third years after the onset of the crisis in the third quarter of 2007, respectively. High Market Power firms have market power above the median ex ante market power measured as the average from 2004 to 2006. Models are estimated using unbalanced panel data with firm and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level (6-digit NAICS). Robust tstatistics are presented below each estimated parameter, and ***, ** and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Testing the Robustness of our model
We begin our robustness checks by verifying whether our results for market power were driven by a measurement error of market power. In columns 1 to 3 of table 5, we re-estimate our baseline regression in equation (1), but using the continuous value of firm market power (PCM) instead of a dummy for high market power.
The results in columns 1 to 3 of table 5 confirm our previous findings in terms of signal and statistical significance. Larger market power causes an increase in net trade credit and a reduction in payable days, as well as a small increase in receivable days in the first year of the crisis. To compare the results in this table with our previous findings, we consider the impact of one standard deviation of market power in our dependent variables. An increase of one standard deviation in market power causes a predicted increase of 3.9, 5.3 and 4.5 days in net trade credit days during the first, second and third years of the crisis, respectively, and a decrease of 3.2, 4.7 and 4.3 days in payable days for the same years. 11 These results are comparable to those obtained previously. In columns 4 and 5 of table 5, we change the dependent variable to receivables / assets and payables / assets, respectively. We find an increase of 0.46% in receivables/assets and an increase of 0.44% in payables/assets for a one standard deviation increase in market power in the second year after the crisis started.
These results are consistent with the idea that firms with greater market power are able to use their larger price flexibility in the product market and increase their receivables and payables by approximately the same amount, as we can infer from the last two columns in table 6. Besides balancing the same shift in receivables and payables, they still reduce their payable days and possibly take advantage of discounts offered by their suppliers.
As another robustness check, we re-estimate our models using only the quarterly average in 2004, three years before the crisis onset, as a measure of market power (and other covariates).
This is done to avoid the possibility that our models could be plagued with endogeneity by the fact that our pre-crisis measure of market power (and other covariates) includes data from 2006, which precedes the crisis too closely. Our inferences 12 stand to all these robustness checks. March 31, 2004 and June 30, 2010 . We define post1, post2 and post3 as dummies for the first, second and third years after the onset of the crisis in the third quarter of 2007, respectively. We also define post as a dummy for the three years after the crisis start. Market Power (continuous variable) is measured as the average gross margin from 2004 to 2006. Cash is the average ex ante cash to assets ratio. Other covariates are defined in Appendix 2 and are always measured as the 2004-2006 (pre-crisis) average. Models are estimated using unbalanced panel data with firm/time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level (6-digit NAICS). Robust t-statistics are presented below each estimated parameter and ***, ** and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
One might also suspect that firms with larger market power could anticipate their change in trade credit policy, as the credit shock precedes the demand shock, and thus our results could be driven by the demand shock that started in September 2008 and not by the credit crisis. To Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) and Almeida et al. (2009) . Table 6 exhibits the results for the estimation of equation (1) 7 show that the inclusion of size in our regressions does not materially change our previous findings, as we can infer by comparing columns (1), (4) and (7), which are our previous coefficients, to the results in columns (2), (5) and (8) A final possible cause of error in our models would be the possibility of correlation of the residuals between our clusters defined at the 6-digit NAICS level, causing standard errors to be underestimated. The estimations reported in columns 3, 6 and 9 of table 7 show that the statistical significance of the coefficients of interest using clustering at the 3-digit NAICS level (resulting in 68 clusters) is only slightly changed compared to the previous results. March 31, 1998, and June 30, 2003 . We define post1, post2 and post3 as dummies for the first, second and third years after the onset of the crisis on 9/11/2001, respectively. Models are estimated using unbalanced panel data with firm/time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level (6-digit NAICS). Robust t-statistics are presented below each estimated parameter, and ***, ** and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Additional checks
Because the crisis starts in 2007 with the bank credit reduction and higher interest rates, one should expect that firms increase their price elasticity of demand for their inputs. As the crisis deepens after September 2008 and the recession hits the product market, we expect this effect to increase. Therefore, firms with higher market power could use their flexibility to decrease their higher margins to avoid losing sales or even increase their sales, as they acknowledge that their customers have increased their price elasticity. To analyze whether this mechanism could be in place for firms with higher market power during the crisis, we also estimate several alternatives to equation (1) March 31, 2004, and June 30, 2010 . We define post1, post2 and post3 as dummies for the first, second and third years after the onset of the crisis in the third quarter of 2007, respectively. Models are estimated using unbalanced panel data with firm/time fixed effects. We introduce the covariate Size, which is the ex ante average natural log of sales for the quarters before the crisis (2004 to 2006) . Standard errors are clustered at the industry level (6-digit NAICS) in all models except models (3), (6) and (9), where we used clustering at the industry level (3-digit NAICS). Robust t-statistics are presented below each estimated parameter, and ***, ** and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Column (1) of Table 8 shows that firms with high market power decrease their gross margins, as we suspected. Indeed, these firms cut their gross margins by 0.7%, 1.8% and 2.8% relative to firms with smaller market power in the first, second and third years following the crisis onset, respectively. By reducing their margins, they are able to obtain an increase of 0.8%, 1.7% and 2.2% in their sales / assets ratio relative to low market power firms in the same years, respectively (column 2 of table 8). The results in column 3 of table 8 shows that their receivables /assets increase by up to 0.9% more than low market power firms in the third year after the shock. These results are consistent with the slightly higher increase in receivable days for high market power firms reported in column 6 of table 4.
(1) March 31, 2004, and June 30, 2010 . We define post1, post2 and post3 as dummies for the first, second and third years after the onset of the crisis in the third quarter of 2007, respectively. We also define post as a dummy for the three years after the crisis start. HiMP are firms with gross margin above the median ex ante gross margin measured as the average from 2004 to 2006. Cash is the average ex ante cash to assets ratio. Other covariates are defined in table 2 and are always measured as the 2004-2006 (pre-crisis) average. Models are estimated using unbalanced panel data with firm/time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level (6-digit NAICS). Robust t-statistics are presented below each estimated parameter, and ***, ** and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Another possibility for the results obtained for the larger reduction in payable days of high market power firms, reported in table 4, is a larger mechanical reduction of inventory days for these firms. The results in column 5 of table 8 show that the change in inventory days for high market power firms is 1.7, 2.5 and 4.7 days smaller than for low market power firms in the first, second and third years of the crisis, respectively, controlling for other features. This could explain only part of the larger reduction in payable days of high market power firms. The relative reduction in inventory also reinforces high market power firms' lower need for the financing of payables.
Concluding remarks
This paper investigates whether product market power affects trade credit decisions, using a sample of Compustat U.S. firms from 2004 to 2010. We exploit the 2007-08 credit crisis in the U.S. as an exogenous source of variation in firm external financing conditions, which in turn affects firms' ability to exert product market power towards their clients and suppliers.
Previous works such as Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) and Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) show that trade credit extension decreases during financial crises and that the redistribution theory does not hold during crises, because even firms with more access to the credit market would have lower liquidity available to be distributed to their customers.
These works also find that constrained firms take more trade credit during the crisis and that firms with higher liquidity pre-crisis will extend more trade credit relative to ex ante low-cash firms.
Our paper confirms most of the previous findings about the effect of financial constraints on trade credit decisions during a crisis. More importantly, our results show that product market power is an important determinant of trade credit decisions, which has been overlooked by previous research in the field. We find that firms with high market power increase their net trade credit days by at least six days relative to those with low market power during the crisis.
We claim that this result is statistically and economically significant, representing approximately 10-15% of the median firm receivable days in our sample. We conduct several tests, and our results are robust to all of them. In particular, we rule out the possibility that financial constraints could drive our findings by estimating separate regressions for constrained and unconstrained firms using the Whited-Wu index, the Hadlock-Pierce S.A. index, and the firms' size, and we find that the effects of product market power on trade credit are present in both constrained and unconstrained firms. Therefore, financial constraints, liquidity and other control variables do not change our results. We also control for other measures of access to external funding, and our results withstand all of these robustness checks. Finally, we use a placebo credit crisis and do not find any effects, as expected. High market power firms are able to provide liquidity to their suppliers by decreasing their payable days on average. This policy, besides possibly taking advantage of early payment discounts, allows these firms to inject extra liquidity into their suppliers during the credit crunch period, thus guaranteeing their inputs and the maintenance of monopoly rents. Since these firms operate with high price-cost margins, they also increase sales relative to firms with low market power by cutting their margins after the crisis onset. Because they obtain larger trade credit discounts, consistent with previous works by Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012) and Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) , they are able to provide their suppliers with liquidity by reducing payables period by up to six days. Due to the low liquidity in the credit market, their suppliers may find it difficult to obtain bank loans secured by their receivables and will thus increase the early payment discount to obtain liquidity from their customers.
This study contributes to the corporate financial policy literature, as it introduces an unexplored dimension to trade credit extension during a credit crisis. We show that trade credit extension and uptake by firms with similar liquidity but different market power may respond very differently to a credit supply shock. This paper is also related to the literature concerning investment in trade credit and financial constraints, and because it introduces a potentially omitted effect in previous works, it can enhance the explanation of the effects documented by Love et al. (2007) , Love & Zaidi (2010) , Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016) , Kestens et al. (2012) and Garcia-Appendini & Montoriol-Garriga (2013) .
Industry Annual Sales Growth
Annual SIC 3-digit industry growth Firm Annual Sales Growth Firm annual growth
Total Assets (top 4.5 billion)
Total Assets limited to a maximum of $4.5 billion (as in Hadlock Pierce (2010))
Firm's Age (top 37 years)
Firm age since first time price appears in CRSP database, upper limit of 37 years.
Dummy Dividend
Equals one if firm paid dividend during the year (COMPUSTAT dvy) and zero otherwise
